THE TURNING-POINT (I)
- 8.1 Disarray in the Kremlin
- 8.2 “A new type of Marxist…”
- 8.3 The breath of fate
- 8.4 A change of course
- 8.5 “Storm 333”
- 8.6 Temporary measures
- NOTES & SOURCES
- click on superscript number [23] to see note and source
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Judgement in Moscow
*
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 shocked the world. As I recall, I found this astonishing. Had the Soviet Union not been steadily expanding until then into literally every corner of the Earth? There was something despicable and affected about this outrage and incomprehension, as if a man married a prostitute and was then indignant to discover she’s not a virgin.
Western politicians and experts vied with each other, offering theories to “explain” Soviet behaviour. As might be expected, the Left saw this event as an “over-reaction to the unfriendly behaviour of the West”, especially NATO’s decision to deploy new short-range missiles in Western Europe. The Right muttered about “Russian imperialism” and “Russia’s traditional urge to reach warm southern waters”. The occupation of Afghanistan was, in fact, the last and not always obligatory stage in the Soviet scenario of “liberation”. In this case, it showed that the Kremlin strategists had been clumsy in their planning, and made good their errors by sending in the troops. By the time Afghanistan was occupied the country had been all but swallowed up by the Soviet Union, although this was something the West had no wish to notice.
*
The history of relations between the two countries illustrates the incapacity of the Soviet system to co-exist with the rest of the world. Of all the non-socialist countries in the world Afghanistan was, probably, the friendliest towards the USSR and almost the first country to establish diplomatic relations after the October 1917 Revolution.
Afghanistan, in its own way, would be an Asian type of Finland for the next six decades. The Kremlin understood that Afghanistan was going nowhere and was in no rush to export revolution. Instead, it “facilitated progress” by training specialists, building roads, setting up industry. From a Marxist point of view, it could not be expected that this backward, feudal State would immediately make the transition to socialism. In any case, a thrifty farmer is in no haste to slaughter the sucking pig, letting it fatten until the day of celebration. That day was drawing near.
Having neutralised the “forces of imperialism”, the “peaceful advance” of the Soviet Union in the 1970s brought a great many Third-World countries into the bosom of the socialist commonwealth. The time had now come for Afghanistan. In the summer of 1973 an almost bloodless palace revolution, staged with Moscow’s approval by Muhammad Daoud, a relation of the king, brought about a historic “change of social formation”. Daoud proclaimed a republic and became the president. He was not a Communist but a moderate social democrat, and no more radical than Europe’s socialists. Moscow regarded him as a stop-gap figure. Like Kerensky in Russia after February 1917, Daoud’s historic role was to prepare the political conditions for further progress. Once again, the Kremlin strategists did not want to force events. For the time being, they were content with Daoud as a transitional figure, especially since the Communist groups were endlessly bickering among themselves and could not unite. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan was set up in 1965 but soon split between the People (Khalq) and Banner (Parcham) factions. As the International Department reported to the Central Committee (21 June 1974, 25-S-1183 [1]):
“Soon after a republic was established… in July 1973, the leaders of Afghanistan’s progressive political organisations, Karmal Babrak (Parcham) and Nur Taraki (Khalq) – who both maintain unofficial contacts with the CPSU Central Committee through the KGB station chief in Kabul – used progressively-inclined elements in the republic’s Central Committee, the government and the army to conduct an unprincipled, internecine struggle to strengthen the position and influence of their own group, and for the right to ‘represent the Communist Party’ in the country.”
In a message to these Afghan Friends the Central Committee wrote [2]:
“It would help to strengthen the country’s national independence if there was a rallying of the forces presently united in Parcham and Khalq, so as to defend the interests of workers, peasants and all the toiling masses in Afghan society on the basis of cooperation with the republican regime and government of the republic headed by Muhammad Daoud.”
Four years later, however, the “April Revolution” took place. The plans (“supposedly being hatched by left-wing forces”) which had concerned Daoud in 1974 were put into action with the full support of the Soviet Union. A simple solution to the unending feud between the Communist factions was to place a wager on Khalq, leaving Parcham to the mercy of its “class brothers”. The leader of Parcham, Babrak Karmal, was appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia and thereby escaped the retribution which immediately befell his colleagues. He did not give up and, like Trotsky before him, continued his struggle in exile. These now seemed trivial matters, however. Another progressive “people’s democratic republic” had appeared on the map, again confirming that the balance of forces in the world had shifted in favour of peace, progress and socialism. There followed a “Treaty of Friendship”, massive economic aid, military advisers and “special supplies” (i.e. armaments). All were provided either free of charge or at a quarter of the real price. The progressive regime set about building a “new life”, slaughtering thousands of “reactionaries”, “religious fanatics” and “revisionists”.
There was just one small detail the Kremlin had overlooked: the views of the Afghans themselves. Suddenly, like a clap of thunder in a clear sky, came reports in March 1979 that Herat, the third largest city in Afghanistan, had fallen to “insurgents”.
8.1: Disarray in the Kremlin
The news caught Moscow unawares. No one knew what was going on. Brezhnev was ill and in his absence the Politburo urgently assembled on a Saturday, under the chairmanship of Kirilenko. Andrei Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reported what he had learned (17-18 March 1979*, Pb [3]):
“… when I talked at 11:00 this morning with Amin, Taraki’s deputy who is the minister of foreign affairs, he did not express the slightest alarm about the situation in Afghanistan. On the contrary, with Olympian tranquillity, he said that the situation was not that difficult: the army had everything under control, and so forth. … Not a single act of insubordination by a governor had been reported, he said; all the governors, in other words, are on the side of the lawful government.
“… approximately two or three hours later, we received news from our comrades that disturbances had begun in Herat. One regiment, an artillery regiment, opened fire on its fellow Afghan soldiers, and part of a second regiment went over to the insurgents. Consequently, only part of the 17th division … remains loyal to the government.
“About half an hour later, our comrades reported again that Comrade Taraki had summoned the chief [Soviet] military advisor Comrade Gorelov and chargé d’affaires Comrade Alexeyev. Taraki appealed to the Soviet Union above all for military equipment, ammunition, and rations. This is already covered in the documents we have presented for the Politburo’s consideration. As far as military aid is concerned, Taraki said, as if in passing, ground and air support might perhaps be required. This must be understood to mean that the deployment of our forces is required, both land and air forces.
“And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns its back on the Soviet Union, this will be a sharp setback to our [foreign] policy. Of course, it is one thing to resort to extreme measures if the Afghan army is on the side of the people, and quite another if the army does not support the lawful government. And finally, third, if the army is against the government and, consequently, against our forces, then things will be very complicated. As Comrades Gorelov and Alexeyev have reported, the mood among the leadership, including Comrade Taraki, is not very happy.”
The minister of defence Ustinov outlined two plans for military intervention. Within 24 hours the 105th airborne division and a motorised infantry regiment could be in Afghanistan, to be followed by other forces. The other plan envisaged the despatch of two divisions. However, a political decision must first be taken [4].
17 MARCH 1979 (POLITBURO)
KOSYGIN. I don’t think that we should prompt the Afghan government into requesting us to deploy our forces. Let them set up their own special units, to be sent to the more critical areas to suppress the insurgents.
USTINOV. In my view we must not, under any circumstances, mix our units with the Afghan units if we send them there.
KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own military units, draw up a document defining their status, and place them under a special command.
*
The option of sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan was considered by the Politburo in March 1979. This was nine months before NATO decided to deploy new missiles in Europe and there were no reveries about reaching “warm waters”. If the Soviet leadership did have any geopolitical conception it was fully expressed by the simple-minded formula: “not to surrender Afghanistan to the enemy” (i.e. the Afghan people).
Conditions changed quickly and new reports about the situation in Afghanistan followed. The measure proposed “in the last resort” was postponed. A telephone conversation the next day, Sunday (18 March 1979*, No. 242 [5]) was especially influential. The Politburo decided that Kosygin should talk to Taraki (with the help of an interpreter). The text of their conversation was immediately read out in full by Kosygin when the Politburo resumed its discussion later that day.
KOSYGIN. Tell Comrade Taraki that I wish to send him warm greetings from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] and all members of the Politburo.
TARAKI. Thank you very much.
KOSYGIN. How is Comrade Taraki’s health? He is not getting very tired?
TARAKI. I’m not tired. Today we had a meeting of the Revolutionary Council.
KOSYGIN. That’s good, I’m very pleased. Please ask Comrade Taraki to outline the situation in Afghanistan.
TARAKI. The situation is bad and getting worse. …
KOSYGIN. Do you have support among the workers, the petty bourgeoisie and the white-collar employees in Herat? Is there anyone still on your side?
TARAKI. There is no active support from the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans. “Do not follow the godless, follow us” – that is the basis of their propaganda.
KOSYGIN. What’s the population in Herat?
TARAKI. 200-250,000 inhabitants. They act according to the situation. They follow where they are led. Now they are on the side of the enemy.
KOSYGIN. Are there many workers there?
TARAKI. Very few — 2,000 in all.
KOSYGIN. What are the prospects, in your view, in Herat?
TARAKI. We believe that this evening or tomorrow morning Herat will fall and be wholly controlled by the enemy. …
Propaganda must be combined with practical assistance. I propose that you put Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft, no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from Kabul.
KOSYGIN. We still have to get to Kabul.
TARAKI. Kushka is a very short distance away from Herat. Troops could be moved to Kabul by plane. If you send troops to Kabul and they move on Herat from Kabul, no one will be any the wiser. They will think they are government troops.
KOSYGIN. I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Within two hours the whole world will know. Everyone will start shouting that the Soviet Union has begun to intervene in Afghanistan. Tell me, Comrade Taraki, if we quickly airlift weapons to Kabul, including tanks, will you find tank-drivers or not?
TARAKI. Very few.
KOSYGIN. How many?
TARAKI. I do not have exact details.
KOSYGIN. If we quickly airlifted tanks to you, the necessary ammunition, and gave you mortars, can you find the specialists who know how to use these weapons?
TARAKI. I can’t answer this question. The Soviet advisers could give an answer.
KOSYGIN. One might think that Afghanistan does not have well-trained military personnel, or very few. Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where did they all go to? …
We have decided to deliver military equipment to you urgently and to take your helicopters and aircraft for repairs. All that will be free of charge. We have also decided to deliver 100,000 tons of grain to you and to raise the price we pay for your gas from $21 per cubic meter to $37.82.
TARAKI. That’s good, but let’s talk of Herat.
KOSYGIN. Let’s. Could you not now form several divisions in Kabul from among progressive people whom you can trust, and not just in Kabul but also in other places? We would provide the necessary weapons.
TARAKI. We don’t have the officers. Iran is sending soldiers to Afghanistan in civilian clothing. Pakistan is also sending its people and officers in Afghan clothes. Why can’t the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them.
KOSYGIN. What else have you to say about Herat?
TARAKI. We want you to send us Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens so they can drive tanks, since we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them put on Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It’s very easy work, in our view. …
*
8.2: “A new type of Marxist…”
This conversation with Taraki and one that followed soon after – not believing his ears, Kosygin rang a second time – had a depressing effect on the Politburo. For the first time, it seemed, they began to realise they had become entangled in a very unpleasant business in Afghanistan, especially when Taraki was yet more frank during his second conversation with Kosygin. As the latter reported, when the Politburo resumed its discussions the following day (17-18 March 1979* (Pb) [6]).
18 MARCH 1979 (POLITBURO)
As concerns Kabul, it is clear from the cables received today that the situation is roughly the same as in Iran. There are demonstrations and crowds of people are massing. Large numbers of individuals, bearing Iranian and Chinese arms, are flowing into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. …
USTINOV. As far as the Tajiks are concerned, they don’t have separate tank units. Now it would be hard to say how many of them are serving in our army’s tank units. … When I talked to Amin he also requested the deployment of forces to Herat to defeat the enemy. …
The Afghan revolution has encountered major difficulties along the way, Amin said in his conversation with me, and its survival depends totally on the Soviet Union.
What’s the problem? Why has this happened? The leadership of Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreciate the role of the Islamic religion. It is under the banner of Islam that the soldiers are joining the other side, and the absolute majority, perhaps, with only rare exceptions, are believers. That is why they are asking us to help drive back the insurgents in Herat. Amin said, somewhat uncertainly, that they can rely on the army. And again, like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for our assistance.
KIRILENKO. It follows that they cannot be certain of their own army. They are depending on one thing only, namely, our tanks and armoured vehicles.
KOSYGIN. In taking a decision to supply such aid, of course, we must seriously think through all the consequences. This is a very serious matter.
ANDROPOV. I have considered this whole issue very attentively, comrades, and concluded that we must consider very, very seriously why we should deploy our forces in Afghanistan. It’s quite clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready now to tackle all the issues it faces in a socialist manner. Therefore, I believe that we can only preserve the revolution in Afghanistan with the aid of our bayonets, and for us that is entirely unacceptable. We cannot take such a risk.
KOSYGIN. Perhaps we should instruct our ambassador, Comrade Vinogradov, to go to the Prime Minister of Iran [Mehdi] Bazargan and inform him that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan cannot be tolerated.
GROMYKO. I completely support Comrade Andropov’s proposal to rule out a deployment of our troops in Afghanistan. The army there is unreliable. Thus, our army, when it enters Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them.
There will no longer be any question of a meeting between Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] and [US President Jimmy] Carter, and the visit of [French President] Giscard d’Estaing at the end of March will be in doubt. What would we gain, we must ask: Afghanistan with its present government, backward economy and insignificant weight in international affairs. On the other hand, we must also remember that we could not justify sending in troops from a legal point of view. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, if it was subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle between one part of the population and another. It should be added that the Afghans haven’t officially requested us to send troops. […]
KOSYGIN. Perhaps we should invite him [Taraki] here and tell him: we are increasing our assistance to you, but we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which has gone over to the adversary or is just sitting on the by-lines, but against the people. There would be huge minuses for us. A whole range of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all.
ANDROPOV. We should tell Comrade Taraki frankly that we will support you by all possible means apart from the deployment of troops. …
KIRILENKO. We gave him everything. And what has come of it? Nothing did any good. They were the ones who executed innocent people for no reason and told us in their own justification, that we also, supposedly, executed people during Lenin’s time. That’s the kind of Marxists they are.
The situation has changed since yesterday. Yesterday, as I already said, we were unanimous about providing military aid, but we carefully discussed the matter, considered various options, and searched for other approaches than the deployment of troops. I believe that we should present our point of view to Leonid Ilych, invite Comrade Taraki to Moscow and tell him everything we have agreed on.
*
The apparatus swung into action. That Monday there was an enlarged session of the Politburo [7], attended by all the Central Committee Secretaries (including a very junior Secretary for Agriculture, Mikhail Gorbachov).
Miraculously, the ailing Brezhnev had been brought back to life. Evidently following a printed text, he voiced approval “for all the measures envisaged in the draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, put forward on Saturday and Sunday” and read them out, one after another. “The question was raised of the direct participation of our forces in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. The members of the Politburo were right, it seems to me, in deciding that we should not at present get involved in this war.”
8.3 The breath of fate
Thus ended the first phase of the Afghan crisis. The situation had somewhat stabilised: two days later the rebellious regiments in Herat were brutally suppressed using tanks and aviation hastily transferred from other towns and cities. By the summer of 1979 things again began to worsen. All the efforts of the Soviet leadership, from that moment to the very day of the invasion, were focussed on preventing an armed intervention.
Reading these documents today you can feel the very breath of fate. Instinctively, the old men in the Kremlin sensed that the Afghan venture would be the beginning of the end for the Soviet regime, and they resisted to the last. This collective wisdom was spelled out in their extended “political document”, analysing the causes of the March crisis (12 April 1979, Pb 149/XIV [8]):
“Our decision not to satisfy the request of the leadership of the Afghan Democratic Republic to deploy Soviet military units to Herat was entirely correct. This approach should be maintained in the event of new anti-government disturbances in Afghanistan, something that cannot be discounted.”
The situation began slipping out of their elderly hands, however. The more they dug in their heels, the closer they were dragged to the brink of the abyss. As they became ever more deeply sucked into the crisis, they repeated to one another, as if invoking an oath, all the arguments against invasion.
Brezhnev suggested a whole range of measures to Taraki, during his Moscow visit, for strengthening the regime in Afghanistan: from the creation of a “united national front” under the leadership of the Popular Democratic Party of Afghanistan to the widening of “political work among the masses”. He proposed working with clerics and religious leaders in order to sow distrust among them and, if they did not openly support the government then, at least, they would not speak out against it in public. Like the old army political officer he once was, Brezhnev passed on a few tips to Taraki (20 March 1979, Pb 486 [9]):
“It’s important that the commanding officers feel confident and secure about their position. You can’t expect much from an army if its leading officers are frequently replaced. That is even more true if those changes are accompanied by arrests. When they see how their fellow officers are being arrested and disappear many officers will themselves begin to feel unsure about their future.”
On the question of Soviet troops Brezhnev was unshakeable:
“Now, as concerns the matter that you raised in your telephone conversation with Comrade Kosygin and then here in Moscow – the possibility that Soviet armed units might be sent to Afghanistan. We examined this question in all its aspects, we thoroughly considered the matter, and I must tell you that it should not be done. It would only play into the hands of the enemy, our enemies and yours. … I would like to think you will treat our observations with understanding.
“Naturally, it would not be sensible, either for you or for us, to publicly announce that we do not intend to do this.”
These were wasted words. Taraki listened, offered thanks for the aid and advice and again began begging for Soviet troops. If troops could not be sent then at least tank-drivers or helicopter pilots. If the Soviet Union could not supply them, then perhaps other socialist countries could? Kosygin could not stand it and, evidently, simply yelled at Taraki (20 March 1979, Pb 499 [10]):
“I cannot understand why you are talking about pilots and drivers. This is a quite unexpected issue for us, and I think the socialist countries will hardly agree to this. The idea of sending people who would drive your tanks and fire on your people is a very sensitive political issue.”
A month later, however, when Soviet military helicopters were being supplied to Afghanistan the question came up again. Once more the Politburo had to adopt a special decree “On the inexpediency of the participation of Soviet crews in the suppression of counter-revolutionary disturbances in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” (21 April 1979, Pb 150/93 [11]). This instructed the chief military adviser to
“persuade Amin that the military helicopters with their Afghan crews will be able, working together with ground forces and warplanes, to deal with the suppression of counter-revolutionary disturbances. You are to draw up, with the Afghan command, the necessary recommendations on this matter.”
In May that year, “in view of increased counter-revolutionary activities by reactionary forces” the Afghan government again asked for aid. Again, they were offered “special” equipment to the value of 53 million roubles (for 1979-1981). The Soviet ambassador in Kabul passed on the Politburo’s offer (24 May 1979, Pb 152/159 [12]):
“… this includes 140 guns and mortar launchers, 90 armoured personnel carriers (50 to be rapidly despatched), 48,000 rifles, about 1,000 grenade launchers, 680 aviation bombs, and medicines and medical equipment to the value of 50,000 roubles to be urgently sent in June-July 1979 …
“As immediate aid in May 100 incendiary cylinders and 150 single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery of gas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas is not considered possible.”
Nevertheless, by June certain Soviet detachments were already in Afghanistan although not taking part in the fighting. The situation had deteriorated so badly that Boris Ponomarev made an emergency trip there. On 28 June Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev reported to the Politburo (29 June 1979*, Pb 156/XI [13]):
“The situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continues to worsen. The actions of the insurgent tribesmen are taking on a wider and more organised character. The reactionary clergy is reinforcing anti-government and anti-Soviet agitation, and widely proposing the setting up of a ‘free Islamic republic’ in Afghanistan like that in Iran …”
And it was resolved
“– To send an experienced general and a group of officers to Afghanistan to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments) to aid the main military advisor. The main task of this group should be to help the commanding officers of detachments and units to organise military actions against the insurgents, and to improve the running of these units and detachments. In addition, Soviet military advisers, down to and including battalion level, should be sent to the Afghan Democratic Republic to the brigade guarding the government and to tank brigades (40-50 individuals, including 20 political workers); military counter-intelligence advisers should be sent to all regiments in the republic.
“– To ensure that the Soviet air squadrons at Bagram airfield are protected and defended, send a parachute battalion to the DRA disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team, with the agreement of the Afghan side. For the defence of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special KGB detachment (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. In early August, after preparations have been completed, send a special GRU detachment to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) to be used if the situation deteriorates sharply for the security and defence of particularly important government installations.
“– Via KGB and GRU channels, pass the Indian leadership disinformation about plans to include Indian Kashmir together with Afghanistan in a “world Islamic republic” to prompt the Indian government to take active steps towards countering the anti-Afghan activities of Pakistan.
“– The Soviet media are to intensify propaganda opposing attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, Iran, China and the USA under the slogan “Hands off Afghanistan!” Support the publication of such materials in third countries.”
Whether the Soviet leaders liked it or not the Rubicon had been crossed. In taking this decision they shouldered full responsibility for life and death in Afghanistan. From now on the issue of Soviet intervention was a question of time.
8.4: A change of course
Ironically, the need to invade Afghanistan arose for quite other reasons than those anticipated. By autumn the “insurgency” had begun to subside as if it had run out of steam, and in no way did it threaten to overturn the regime. A certain stabilisation set in. Then fighting began within the ranks of the Afghan leadership.
In September Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s deputy and minister of foreign affairs, overthrew the Afghan leader and, contrary to the will of Moscow, soon had him murdered. There followed purges among the leaders, acts of revenge and, the Kremlin began to feel, changes in the political loyalties of the new leadership. At the end of October Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomaryov reported to the Politburo (29 October 1979, No 0937 [14]).
“The situation in Afghanistan following the events of 13-16 September this year, as the result of which Taraki was deposed and then physically eliminated, remains extremely complicated.
“Alongside superficial gestures (beginning to draft a [new] constitution, freeing some people arrested earlier), Amin has in fact widened the scale of repression within the Party, the army, the State apparatus and non-governmental organizations in his efforts to secure his hold on power. Clearly, he intends to remove practically all the Party and State’s notable figures from the political arena, regarding them as his present or potential opponents.
“The signals sent by Amin that he has established contacts with representatives of the right-wing Muslim opposition and leaders of tribes hostile to the government are unsettling. He is ready to reach agreement with them to end their armed struggle against the present government by making ‘compromises’ that will be to the detriment of the country’s progressive development.
“Recently there have been signs that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to conduct a more ‘balanced policy’ in relation to the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are concluding that Afghanistan could change its policies in a direction favourable to Washington.
“Amin’s behaviour towards the USSR has revealed, ever more clearly, his insincerity and two-faced nature. In practice, Amin is not only failing to take measures to stem anti-Soviet feeling: he is in fact encouraging such feelings. He was responsible for distributing an account of the supposed involvement of Soviet representatives in an ‘assassination attempt’ on him during the 13-16 September events this year. Amin and his immediate entourage have sunk to slanderous fabrications about the involvement of Soviet personnel in the repressive campaigns carried out in Afghanistan.
“Healthy forces within the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and the Afghan army are expressing their serious concern about the situation unfolding within the country, which could lead to a loss of the gains of the April Revolution. These forces are scattered, however, and survive on an illegal basis.”
How well-founded were Moscow’s fears about “Amin’s re-orientation towards the West”? Was the Kremlin’s involvement in the “attempted assassination” a fabrication? Today it is hard to say. It is beyond doubt that Amin was not their candidate: he did not enjoy their confidence and clearly behaved too independently. Not only had he escaped their supervision but, it seems, he believed that he could dictate his rules of play to Moscow.
After the Soviet invasion and his murder in December 1979 Moscow propaganda would declare Amin “a CIA agent”, something which cannot be taken seriously. Perhaps he was simply trying to stabilise the situation – demonstrating his independence, keeping a certain distance from Moscow, while simultaneously conducting negotiations with the opposing side. Who knows? In the circumstances that would not have been such a stupid way to proceed. The prospect of “surrendering” Afghanistan, however, and not merely to some “insurgents” but to their deadly enemies, was too frightening for the Soviet leaders. It was one thing to lose a revolution and quite another to create a bridgehead from which the ideological enemy would be a source of fatal danger to their control over Central Asia. From this moment onwards, there can be no doubt, the fate of Amin was decided and the invasion became inevitable.
This can be seen from a decision recommended in the report quoted above and adopted by the Politburo a month before (31 October 1979*, Pb 172-108 [15]):
“Continue to work actively with Amin and with the current leadership of the PDPA and the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] giving Amin no grounds to believe we do not trust him and don’t wish to deal with him. Use the contacts with Amin to exert a suitable influence and, simultaneously, further expose his true intentions.”
Moscow had begun to create a new team of leaders from the “healthy core” of the Party, army and State apparatus and they went about it very skilfully. Babrak Karmal had continued his intrigues from his safe haven in Prague. Now he was taken out of the wardrobe and dusted down. The remnants of Parcham and Khalq were reconciled and a they had the makings of a “government of national unity”. By December, in record time, everything was ready, including the plan for the military aspect of the operation. I don’t know about Amin’s “treachery”: the level of deceit practiced by the Soviet leaders far outstripped that of their Oriental brothers.
Suddenly, in early December, Amin was sent a Soviet battalion that he had been requesting since the summer for his own protection. With poker faces Andropov and Ogarkov submitted their proposal to the Central Committee (6 December 1979*, Pb 176/82 [16]):
“[…] H. Amin has recently and insistently raised the necessity of sending a Soviet motorized rifle battalion to Kabul to defend his residence. In view of the present situation and H. Amin’s request, we consider it would be expedient to send a special GRU detachment trained for this purpose to Afghanistan, with a complement of about 500 men, in a uniform which does not reveal their origin as members of the Soviet Armed Forces.
“Since the sending of the detachment to Kabul has been agreed with the Afghan side, we think it could be transferred by military aviation during the first ten days of December of this year.”
This was the spetsnaz unit that, on the night of 28 December, took Amin’s palace by storm. They had managed, after all, to find some Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Soviet army and there was no difficulty about dressing them up in Afghan uniform.
8.5: “Storm 333”
When it came to matters of a genuinely sensitive nature, the Soviet leaders demonstrated an unbelievable level of secrecy, trusting no one, not even their closest associates. Often you can find no trace of these subjects in their papers. We should not be surprised, therefore, that no document can be found in the most secret of the Politburo archives giving the order to invade Afghanistan, far less to dispose of Amin. These decisions were taken by the entire Politburo, however. No alternative was possible in the Soviet system, where each crime was signed in blood by them all, as in Dostoyevsky’s Demons. No one could remain untainted.
The decision to send Soviet forces to Afghanistan and overthrow the government of that “democratic republic” was taken on 12 December 1979 by ten members of the Politburo – Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko, Chernenko, Pelshe, Suslov, Kirilenko, Grishin and Tikhonov; Ponomaryov was present but, as a candidate member, he did not have the right to vote. Those who were away or unwell still had to counter-sign this decision: Kunayev added his signature on 25 December; Romanov and Shcherbitsky added theirs on 26 December. The document, if it can be so termed, is an ordinary page of paper on which someone (Chernenko, apparently) wrote by hand a vague text in which the word Afghanistan did not appear. It is titled “Concerning the situation in A”:
“1. Approve the suggestions and measures put forward by Comrades Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko.
Permit them during the implementation of these measures to make amendments that do not affect the principal.
Present to the Politburo in good time issues that require a decision by the Central Committee.
Entrust Comrades Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko to implement these measures.
2. Instruct Comrades Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko to keep the Politburo informed as to how the implementation of the named measures is proceeding.
Central Committee Secretary, L. Brezhnev.
This is the historic Politburo decision (12 December 1979*, Pb 176/125 [17]) that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Afghans, the ill-fated president Hafizullah Amin being among the first, and tens of thousands of young men from all corners of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union.
A smaller group met once more on 26 December at Brezhnev’s out-of-town dacha (as always, he was ill) evidently to discuss Amin. Another seemingly insignificant piece of paper [18], a typed text this time, records:
“26 December 1979 (at the dacha – present Comrades Brezhnev, Ustinov, Gromyko, Chernenko). Comrades Ustinov, Gromyko and Andropov reported on progress in the implementation of Central Committee Resolution No 176/126 of 12 December 1979.
“Comrade Brezhnev voiced several proposals, after approving the action the comrades had outlined for the immediate future.
“It was recognised as expedient that the Politburo commission of the same membership should proceed with the plan presented, thoroughly considering each step in its actions. Issues that require a decision by the Central Committee to be presented to the Politburo in good time.
“Correct Record, signed [K Chernenko] 27 December 1979.”
Who knows what details of the operation they were clarifying just before the coup in Kabul? Only in 1992 when the Soviet regime had collapsed and people’s tongues were loosened did detailed accounts by participants in these events (unemployed KGB and spetsnaz officers, former “advisers”) appear in the Russian press.
Today we know that the operation’s codename was “Storm 333” and, apart from the spetsnaz unit, two special KGB groups were also involved. Taraki’s requests had not gone unheeded, it is ironic to note. In May 1979, soon after the March events in Afghanistan, the Soviet authorities had begun to create a spetsnaz (special tasks) unit made up almost entirely of Central Asians (hence its nickname, the Muslim battalion). The soldiers were drawn, for the most part, from intelligence and tank detachments. The main requirement was a knowledge of Oriental languages and a good physique. Only their commander, Colonel Kolesnik, was not Asian.
On 10-12 December the entire battalion, about 500 men wearing Afghan uniforms, was transferred to the airbase at Bagram and on 21 December set out to “guard” Amin’s residence, the palace Tadj Bek. The Afghan president had retreated there after yet another unsuccessful attempt on his life. The Muslim battalion was joined by the KGB special units and they deployed between the sentries and the Afghan battalions. Their commanding officers were summoned to the Soviet embassy to meet General Magometov, the main military adviser in the country, and to a certain General Bogdanov, who headed the KGB apparatus in Afghanistan. It was only then that the officers learned of the true aims of their sudden relocation [19].
“Bogdanov wanted to know how the palace was defended and then, as though in passing, unexpectedly suggested that we consider a possible plan of action if, suddenly, we had to seize the palace instead of protecting it. All night we worked on a plan of military operations. We made lengthy and scrupulous calculations.”
They understood this was the real task they had been sent to Kabul to carry out.
“On the morning of 24 December Colonel Kolesnik gave a detailed presentation of the plan for seizing the palace. After long discussion, the commanding officers of the battalion were told, Wait. They had to wait some time. Only during the afternoon were they told that the decision had been confirmed. No one signed the plan, however. They were told, Get moving!”
Meanwhile, at 3 pm on 25 December 1979 Soviet troops began moving into Afghanistan. The first to cross the Amu River were the intelligence corps. Next across the bridge were the remaining units of the 108th motorised infantry division. The troops advanced to the town of Puli-Khumri and then through the Salang Pass towards Kabul. At the same time, military transport planes began to transfer the main forces of the paratroops division and a separate paratroops regiment to the airfields at Kabul and Bagram. Over a period of 47 hours the soldiers, officers and equipment were moved to Afghanistan in 343 flights. This resulted in the transfer to Kabul and Bagram of 7,700 servicemen, 894 units of military equipment and 1,062 tons of various cargo. This was the invasion that the alarmed Americans watched through their satellites. However, the main part of the operation could not be discerned from space.
“The preparation for storming Amin’s palace began on the morning of 27 December. The KGB men had a detailed plan of Tadj Bek. By the time operation Storm-333 began, the spetsnaz of the Muslim battalion and the KGB groups knew their main target in detail: the most convenient approaches, how the shifts of guards on duty were organised, the total numbers of guards and of Amin’s bodyguards, the location of the machine-gun nests, armoured personnel carriers and tanks, the internal layout of the palace rooms and corridors, the location of radio-telecommunications apparatus. …
“The soldiers of the Muslim battalion and the KGB special detachments were told that Amin was guilty of mass repression: he had ordered the deaths of thousands of innocent people, he had betrayed the cause of the April Revolution, he had entered a conspiracy with the CIA, and so on. Few accepted this account, it is true, because it would then have made more sense for Amin to invite the Americans, not Soviet forces.”
What of the treacherous Amin? In September, he had himself deceived Brezhnev and Andropov, promising to save Taraki’s life when the latter had already been strangled. As a result, the Soviet leadership had bargained with Amin for 2-3 days for the life of the leader of the April Revolution when he was already dead. Yet, strange as it may seem, Amin put his faith in the Soviet leaders. Probably he believed that victors are not punished and that they would be friendly towards him. Perhaps he felt sure that the Russians also “respect only force”. Whatever the case he surrounded himself with Soviet military advisers, and would only trust doctors from the USSR. Amin relied, in the final analysis, on Soviet troops and constantly appealed for them to be sent to Afghanistan; he placed his hopes on them and, to a far less extent, on his own Afghan soldiers.
“Amin suspected nothing and was at that moment in a state of euphoria that he had achieved his goal – Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan. On 27 December, he organised a dinner in his luxurious palace for the members of the Politburo, government ministers and their families.
“Suddenly during the meal the secretary general of the PDPA [Amin] and many of his guests began to feel unwell. Some of them lost consciousness. Amin was completely ‘knocked out’. His wife immediately summoned the commander of the presidential guard … who began ringing for help from the Central Military Hospital … and the polyclinic at the Soviet embassy. The food and the pomegranate juice were immediately sent for expert analysis. The Uzbek cooks were detained. A group of Soviet doctors, working as advisers in Kabul arrived at the palace. They decided to aid the sick but an Afghan medic ran up to them. … He led them to Amin who, in his words, was in a very bad way. They mounted the staircase. Amin was lying in one of the rooms, wearing only his underpants, with a sagging jaw and his eyes rolled up in his head. Was he dead? They felt for his pulse, it was barely beating. Was he dying?
“Without thinking that they were disrupting someone else’s plans, the doctors got to work to save the head of a ‘country friendly to the USSR’. They injected him, pumped his stomach, again injected him, inserted drips in his veins… A considerable time passed before Amin’s eyelids flickered and he came round. ‘Why has this happened in my house?’ he then asked with surprise. ‘Who did this? Was it an accident or was it deliberate?’
“The KGB special units stormed into the building, followed by the spetsnaz soldiers. The battle in front of the palace and, especially, inside the building became very fierce. Orders had been given to allow no one to leave the palace alive. The soldiers and officers of Amin’s bodyguard, 100-150 men, put up a desperate resistance and did not surrender. A fire started on the second floor of the palace.”
One of the KGB officers would later recall those minutes.
“… At first only the KGB men took part in storming the palace. For fear we yelled as loudly as we could, mostly obscenities, and that helped us not only psychologically but practically. The soldiers of Amin’s bodyguard first took us for Afghan insurgents. Hearing Russian, however, they surrendered as to a just and higher force. We found out later that many of them had trained at the paratroops school in Ryazan and had remembered Russian obscenities all their lives.”
The Soviet doctors hid where they could. Those who had been trying to revive Amin hid behind the bar. Probably, they were the last to see him alive:
“Ever more powerful explosions shook Tadj Bek. Along the corridor, caught in the reflection of the fire walked … Amin. He was wearing white underpants, and carried bottles of the IV solution, like grenades, raised high in his hands from arms wrapped in tubes. One could only imagine how much effort this cost him and how many injections he had been given.
“’Amin?!’ The doctors who spotted him could not believe their eyes. One of the doctors ran out from their cover, pulled the needles out of Amin’s arms and led him to the bar. Amin leant against the wall but immediately stiffened and listened. The doctors also heard a child crying and from a side-room somewhere appeared Amin’s five-year-old son, wiping his tears with his fists. When he saw his father, he ran to him and hugged him round the legs. Amin pressed the boy’s head against him and they both sat down against the wall. It was such a painful, heart-rending sight that the doctor turned away from father and son, and took a step towards the bar: ‘I can’t watch this, let’s get out of here’.”
After the palace had been stormed the Kabul radio station broadcast an appeal recorded earlier by Babrak Karmal to the people of Afghanistan: “Today the torture machine of Amin and his hirelings has been broken, those savage executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousands of our compatriots — fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters, children and old men…” These were just words. The new regime differed little from its predecessor. Karmal meanwhile remained at Bagram under the protection of the paratroops regiment. At half past midnight on 28 December he received a phone call from Andropov. He sent his own congratulations and Brezhnev’s personal greetings on the victory in the second stage of the revolution to the new chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the People’s Republic of Afghanistan.
So many events lay concealed behind the unprepossessing hand-written note signed by the members of the Politburo on 12 December at Brezhnev’s dacha.
8.6: Temporary measures
This only became known later. When the Politburo Commission, i.e. Comrades Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov and Ponomaryov, brought the other members up to date on 31 December 1979 they did not say what had happened, but presented the official version of events [20]:
“On a wave of patriotic sentiment that swept the wide masses of the Afghan population when Soviet forces were deployed, and in strict accordance with the terms of the 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty, forces opposed to Amin organized an armed uprising on the night of 27-28 December and Amin’s regime was overthrown. This uprising gained broad support among the working masses, the intelligentsia, significant sections of the Afghan army, and the State apparatus, all of which welcomed the formation of a new leadership for Afghanistan and the PDPA.
Official Soviet announcements in the same spirit, sometimes using exactly the same expressions, had already been prepared and approved by the Politburo (27 December 1979, Pb 177/151 [21]) when Amin, we must suppose, was still alive or, perhaps, just when he and his guests were drinking the contaminated pomegranate juice. This applied both to statements by TASS and to despatches sent to all Soviet ambassadors and, separately, to the Soviet representative at the United Nations. It applied, likewise, to the Central Committee letters sent to several restricted readerships: CPSU organisations, the leadership of the socialist bloc countries and of the communist and workers parties of the non-socialist countries. Without exception, all were given the explanation that (1) the measures were “temporary”, and that (2) the Soviet forces introduced into Afghanistan were a “limited contingent”. The only difference was that the Central Committee letter to “outsiders” made no reference to Amin: it was as if he had never existed. “Our people”, i.e. Central Committee members, the Central Committee of the USSR’s constituent republics, and the Regional Party committees, were offered the additional explanation that [22]
“in carrying out the said measures the Politburo was taking the strategic position of Afghanistan into account. Bordering directly on the USSR, it is located next to the Soviet republics in Central Asia, it has an extended border, and China is not far away. Therefore, it was necessary to demonstrate concern for the security of our socialist Motherland and remember our international duty.”
The Soviet propaganda machine was instructed “to give a firm and well-argued rebuttal to any possible insinuations about supposed Soviet interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs”.
US President Jimmy Carter received an especially brazen and insulting reply when he contacted Brezhnev over the hotline. Evidently, the Kremlin psychologists were calculating that deliberate rudeness would astound and, perhaps, scare the enemy (29 December 1979, Pb 177/220 [23]).
“The assertion in your message that the Soviet Union supposedly did something to overthrow the government of Afghanistan is wholly unacceptable and does not reflect reality. I can emphatically state that the change in the Afghan leadership was carried out by the Afghans themselves and by them alone. Ask the Afghan government about this. …
“Let this be our advice to you. The American side could make its own contribution by ending the armed intervention in Afghanistan from outside.”
With good reason Carter later commented that he had learned more about the Soviet Union during those December days than in his whole life.
There followed an embargo on grain exports to the USSR, cultural exchanges were reduced, the summer 1980 Olympic Games in the USSR were boycotted, and there was a growth in the military budget of NATO countries. The Western reaction was quite strong and this was thanks, in no small measure, to the arrest and banishment to Gorky of Andrei Sakharov, an event that shocked people no less than the invasion itself.
The détente of the 1970s with its putrid daydreams of “convergence” and “socialism with human face” became a thing of the past. The new decade opened with a far healthier climate of resistance and “conservative revolution”. The world moved decisively to the right. In Europe one socialist government after another disappeared and the forces of peace, progress and socialism found themselves, unexpectedly, on the defensive. Only in Moscow did the Soviet leadership long fail to understand the scale of this disaster and act as though nothing had occurred. There would be cries of outrage, they thought, as more than once in the past. Then people would calm down, everything would start again and détente would continue. In June 1980, a plenum of the Central Committee was held. Bold speeches about the invincible might of the Soviet Union were again heard in the Kremlin and the hall echoed to the prolonged applause of the audience. Gromyko was in oratorical mode (23 June 1980, Central Committee Plenum [24])
“… It is impossible to see one tendency or another in the right perspective if we do not take into account the decisive factor in world development: the steady strengthening of the positions of socialism, in the international arena as well.”
And what about the USA, the imperialists?[25]
“The US presidential elections are not helping the normal course of Soviet-American relations. Once every four years, as a rule, they lead to anti-Soviet hysteria. Candidates who are unable to offer effective programmes to correct the serious flaws in US domestic and foreign policy, and its outright failures, compete to attack and slander the Soviet Union.
“The choice of presidential candidates, incidentally, is not great. There is not much to choose between Carter and Reagan who are leading the field. A gloomy joke is circulating among Americans: ‘The only good thing is that Carter and Reagan cannot be in the White House at the same time’,” (laughter in the hall).
Brezhnev summed up [26]
“… We shall not spare our efforts in the future – to preserve détente and all the advantages the 1970s brought us; to achieve a shift towards disarmament; to support the right of nations to free and independent development; and to protect and strengthen peace.” (Prolonged applause).
At the end a resolution was adopted [27]:
“The Plenum of the Central Committee fully approves the measures taken to provide Afghanistan with every kind of aid to repel armed assaults and interference from outside, the aim of which is to stifle the Afghan Revolution and create an imperialist bridgehead for military aggression on the southern borders of the USSR.
“In the present situation, when the opportunistic actions of the USA and its accomplices have led to an increase in military danger, the Plenum instructs the Politburo of the Central Committee to steadfastly continue the course of the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses: to strengthen in every way the fraternal union of socialist states; to support the just struggle of nations for freedom and independence, peaceful co-existence and a curb on the arms race; to preserve and develop international détente, and mutually beneficial cooperation in economic, scientific and cultural fields.
“At the same time the Plenum believes that the scheming of imperialism and other enemies of peace demands constant vigilance and the all-round strengthening of our State’s defence capability, in order to frustrate the plans of imperialism to attain military supremacy and impose its will on the world.”
The latest swing from cold war to détente and back again, ended to wild applause in the Kremlin. The programme for the last stage in the “cold war” was adopted, with its arms race and its “struggle for peace”.
Chapter 9: “Pages of Shame” …
*
NOTES & SOURCES
CHAPTER EIGHT: “Afghanistan”
An asterisk (*) and bold type indicate that a file in the Bukovsky Archives has been fully or partially translated into English. (The symbol ‘^’ means that the Russian originals of 2 documents cited in this chapter are not available online.)
The archival description of the various sources mentioned in the text and in these notes has been added, indicating their size and contents, and providing access to the original Russian text.
Annotated translations by the Wilson Center’s Cold War in History Project (CWIHP) were consulted and checked against the Russian originals in the Bukovsky Archives.
Click arrow below note to return to text.
JC, December 2024
*
- 21 June 1974, 25-S-1183, p. 5 in 26 June 1974 (St 129/11) file – Secretariat. Information to leaders of Afghan Communist groups (Parcham and Khalq) about the results of Daoud’s visit to USSR [R 26 June 1974, St 129-11]. 6 pp.
↩︎ - 26 June 1974 (St 129/11), p. 4. See note 1.
↩︎ - 17-18 March 1979*, Pb, pp. 2-4. See note 4.
↩︎ - 17-18 March 1979* (Pb), p. 7. – Transcript of Politburo meeting (17-19 March) about the worsening situation in Afghanistan [R 17-18 March 1979, Pb]. 28 pp.
↩︎ - 18 March 1979*, No. 242, – Transcript of KOSYGIN’s March telephone conversation with MOHAMED TARAKI, Afghan prime minister. 29 June Politburo decision, and report by GROMYKO, ANDROPOV, PONOMARYOV and KOSYGIN [R 18 March 1979, No 242]. 19 pp.
↩︎ - 17-18 March 1979* (Pb), pp 12-17. See note 4.
↩︎ - 17-18 March 1979* (Pb), pp 18-28. See note 4.
↩︎ - 1 April 1979, No 279, 25-S-576, p. 7 (Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomaryov) in 12 April 1979, Pb 149/XIV file. The Soviet position in relation to Afghanistan [R 12 April 1979, Pb 149-XIV]. 12 pp.
↩︎ - 20 March 1979, Pb 486 – Politburo, pp. 3-4. Transcript of BREZHNEV’s conversation with Afghan prime minister TARAKI [R 20 March 1979, Pb 486]. 8 pp.
↩︎ - 20 March 1979, Pb 499 – Politburo, p. 12. Transcript of conversation of KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, USTINOV and PONOMARYOV with Afghan prime minister TARAKI [R 20 March 1979, Pb 499]. 15 pp.
↩︎ - 21 April 1979, Pb 150/93 – Politburo. Do not to send Soviet helicopter pilots to suppress counter-revolutionary movement in Afghanistan [R 21 April 1979, Pb 150-93]. 2 pp.
↩︎ - 24 May 1979, Pb 152/159 – Politburo. Additional military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [R 24 May 1979, Pb 152-159]. 3 pp.
↩︎ - 29 June 1979*, Pb 156/XI – Politburo, pp. 2-5. Actions to deal with the worsening situation in Afghanistan; recommendations from Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomaryov; letter to Soviet ambassador in Kabul [R 29 June 1979, Pb 156-IX]. 11 pp.
↩︎ - 29 October 1979, No 0937, pp. 2-7 in 31 October 1979* (Pb 172/108) – Politburo. About the situation in Afghanistan, reports from GROMYKO, USTINOV and PONOMARYOV. [R 31 October 1979, Pb 172-108] total 10 pp.
↩︎ - 31 October 1979*, Pb 172-108, p. 4. See note 14.
↩︎ - 6 December 1979*, Pb 176/82 – Politburo. Decision to dispatch special forces to Afghanistan on recommendation of KGB and Ministry of Defence [R 6 December 1979, Pb 176-82]. 2 pp.
↩︎ - 12 December 1979*, Pb 176/125 – Politburo. The situation in “A” – the decision to invade Afghanistan – as recorded in two vague documents, 12 and 26 December [R 12 December 1979, No 997]. 2 pp.
↩︎ - 26 December, see note 17.
↩︎ - A. Lyakhovsky, “Operation Storm”, Sovershenno Sekretno, No 8, 1992. Source for this and subsequent quotations in the section.
↩︎ - 31 December 1979, 2519-A – Politburo. “About Afghanistan” – GROMYKO and others report on the situation after 27-28 December 1979 [R 31 December 1979, 2519-A]. 5 pp.
↩︎ - 27 December 1979, Pb 177/151, pp. 1-2. See note 22.
↩︎ - 27 December 1979 (Pb 177/151), pp 17-18. – Politburo. Directives to Soviet ambassadors about correct propaganda concerning Soviet actions in Afghanistan [R 27 December 1979, Pb 177-151] 24 pp.
↩︎ - 29 December 1979, Pb 177/220 – Politburo. Response to CARTER memorandum on Afghanistan over hotline. [R 29 December 1979, Pb 177-220]. 5 pp.
↩︎ - 23 June 1980, Central Committee Plenum, p. 5. – Stenographic minutes of Central Committee Plenum. [R 23 June 1980, Central Committee] total 28 pp.
↩︎ - 23 June 1980, p. 10. See note 24.
↩︎ - 23 June 1980, p. 4. See note 24.
↩︎ - 23 June 1980, pp 26 & 29. See note 24.
↩︎
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The Bukovsky Archives 